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Acr oF 1933--SALE oF SHAREs TO EMPLOYEES
lNvoLVING A PtmLIC OFFERING-As it had done in the nine preceding
years defendant corporation sought to win the loyalty of its key employees by
offering for their direct purchase some 10,000 shares of its common stock at a
price comparing favorably with that in the market. Plaintiff commission sought
to enjoin the sale in the federal district court under §77(e) of the Securities
Act of 19331 which prohibits sales by mail or interstate commerce of securities
not registered with plaintiff. The defense was that §77(d)(I) exempted the
sale from registration as one "not involving a public offering." Held, judgment
for the defendant. This is not an offering of shares to the public but merely a
sensible way of improving the employer-employee relationship. Securities &
F.xchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., (D.C. Mo. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 964.
Congress may have intended the number of acceptors to be decisive in
determining whether a public offering has been made within the meaning of
the exemption clause in §77(d)(l).2 However, this would mean that an offer
addressed to all the world is not public if its acceptance is limited to the one
man who is first with his money. It would also mean that in determining when
a registration statement is required, the courts are to ignore the very persons for
whose benefit the requirement is designed, that is, the persons to whom an
offer to sell the shares is made and who can use the statement's information to
decide whether to accept.3 In the few cases thus far decided on the point, the
courts make it clear that an offering is public or not depending on the particular
facts of each case,4 with special emphasis on the number of persons to whom
CoRPoRATI0Ns-SEcuR1TIEs

AS NOT

115 U.S.C. (1946) §77a.
An issuer may "make a specific or an isolated sale of its securities to a particular person, but ••• if a sale ••• should be made generally to the public • • • that transaction shall
come within the purview of the act." H.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st sess. 16 (1933). Cf.
H.Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st sess. 25 (1933): "Sales of stock to stockholders become
subject to the act unless the stockholders are so small in number that the sale to them does
not become a public offering."
3 The registration statement must contain, inter alia, information concerning profit and
loss, capitalization and funded debt, basis for computing asking price, and purposes to which
proceeds will be put. 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77(aa), Schedule A.
4 S.E.C. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., (9th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 699.
2
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the original offer is made,5 their knowledge of the value of the shares, and the
manner in which the offering is made. As to the first factor, there is little authority on the crucial issue of how many original offerees are needed to make
an offering public. The decided cases involve either so many or so few offerees
that the issue is not fairly raised,6 and in the principal case it was not even
considered. It is suggested that the courts adopt as a working hypothesis the
commission's contention in the principal case that an offering is public when
made to more than 100 persons, or, if this test seems too rigid, adopt the standard
of "substantial number of offerees" suggested in an early commission release. 7
At any rate, in the principal case the 500 offerees numbering about seven per
cent of the total working force are a rather large number for a private offering.
It is submitted that on principle the courts should also consider the number of
second-hand offerees created by turnover of the original issue, since they too
need the information of a registration statement. In the principal case this number would be small since, although 5,000 shares were likely to be accepted and
at a price low enough to permit resale, the employees who accepted generally
resold only on leaving defendant's employ. The second factor to be considered
is whether the offeree has firsthand knowledge of what he is buying.8 Indeed,
the very word "public" suggests a distinction between the outsider, who buys
on the basis of secondary information, and the insider, who can rely on close
contact with the facts which determine the value of the shares. It is suggested
that this tesf be redefined in terms of the informational purpose of the registration statement. Thus a public offering ought to be found and a registration
statement required whenever the offeree is so deficient in firsthand knowledge
that he needs the information which the statement is designed to disclose.
Division of labor in a large corporation would seem to make it improbable that
very many of the 500 key employees in the principal case knew firsthand the
value of their corporation's shares. The third factor to be considered is the
manner in which the offering is made. Newspaper advertisements and form

5 Public offerings were found in Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, (D.C. Del. 1943)
52 F. Supp. 999 (open-end trust agreement running to 800,000 shares held by 3,500
persons); and in Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, (9th Ck. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 335 (readjustment of capital account involving 1100 shareholders).
6 The closest case was Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, supra note 5.
7 Release No. 97, Pt. 6, Dec. 28, 1933, quoted in I CCH FED. SEc. LAw SEnv.
112266.41, based on H.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st sess. 16 (1933), supra note I. This
release was modified in Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935, quoted in I CCH FED. SEc. LAw
SEnv. 112266.17, which set out as criteria the number of offerees and their relationship to
each other and to the issuer, number of units offered, size of offering, and manner of
offering.
8 Campbell v. Degenther, (D.C. Pa. 1951) 4 CCH FED. SEc. LAw SEnv. 1190,508 (offer
to former partner); and S.E.C. v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1936)
I CCH FED. SEc. LAw SEnv. 112266.52 (offer to shareholders who lived close to corporation's head office and knew its officers and general state of affairs). Cf. H.Rep. No. 1838,
73d Cong., 2d sess. 41 (1934), stating that "the parties in employees stock investment
plans may be in as great need of the protection afforded by the availability of information
concerning the issuer for whom they work as are most other members of the public."
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letters tend to indicate a public offering,9 but transmission by word of mouth
does not. In the principal case the employees to be offered shares were contacted personally by their department managers, so that, on this ground at least,
the offering appears private. It is inevitable that courts will tend to :6.nd grounds
for exemption from registration when the offering is clearly beneficial to all
concerned and registration seems a needless form. 10 Thus the principal case held
no public offering on finding that the offering was a mutually advantageous way .
to better the employer-employee relationship. Although the result in the case
cannot be severely criticized, it would seem that the court's approach was erroneous in ignoring the standards prescribed by the statute and the decided cases
and in basing its decision purely on grounds of policy.
William E. Beringer, S.Ed.

9 People v. Ruthven, 160 Misc. 112, 288 N.Y.S. 631 (1936), decided under New
York General Business Law.
10 Cf. Siebenthaler v. Aircraft Accessories Corp., (D.C. Mo. 1940) I CCH FED. SEc.
LAw SERV. i]2266.15, which exempted a sale of shares for needed property.

